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ILLINOIS MULTISTATE PLAINTIFF CLASS ACTIONS:
ABROGATION OF JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY-
MINER V. GILLETTE CO.
In concert with the rise of consumerism, class suits have become an in-
creasingly important weapon in deterring consumer exploitation.' By acting
as a vehicle to redress group wrongs, such suits purportedly prevent a
multiplicity of individual actions from being instituted for the same
wrongful act while concurrently providing relief to those whose claims may
otherwise be too small to warrant individual legal redress. 2
In the typical consumer class suit,3 a nationwide class of injured con-
sumers is sought to be joined in order to obtain the largest possible judg-
ment against the defendant.' Consequently, multistate class actions tradi-
tionally were filed in the federal courts because these courts had jurisdiction
to hear actions involving multistate plaintiff classes., A recent series of pro-
1. See Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and
the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 845 (1974); Ross, Multistate Con-
sumer Class Actions in Illinois, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 397, 398 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Ross]; Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L.
REV. 407, 410 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Starrs]; Tornquist, Roadmap to Illinois Class Ac-
tions, 5 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 45, 49 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tornquist].
2. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (1968), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
See Starrs, supra note 1, at 416-17; Tornquist, supra note 1, at 48-49. See also Steinberg v.
Chicago Medical School, 69 I11. 2d 320, 334-35, 371 N.E.2d 634, 641-42 (1977) (class actions
important "procedural vehicles" for redressing multiple claims); Hoover v. May Dep't Stores
Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 106, 111-12, 378 N.E.2d 762, 767-68 (5th Dist. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 77 I1. 2d 93, 395 N.E.2d 541 (1979) (representative suits particularly useful to redress
trivial consumer claims). It has been suggested that initiation of small claim class actions in-
crease, rather than decrease the judicial workload, and that the only persons to derive any
meaningful benefit from such actions are the attorneys for the plaintiff class. See Delle Donne
& Van Horn, Pennsylvania Class Actions: The Future in Light of Recent Restrictions on
Federal Access?, 78 DiCK. L. REV. 460, 479-80 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Delle Donne & Van
Horn]; Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court Class Action Adjudications to Provide
an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1002, 1020 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Impact].
3. The terms "consumer class suit," "class action," and "class suit" are used synony-
mously in this Note to refer to representative actions whereby each individual sought to be in-
cluded in the plaintiff class has sustained similar, albeit relatively minor, injuries as a result of
a defendant's wrongful conduct. Although the claims of individual class members are separate
and distinct, a common question of fact or law predominates over any individual concerns of
the class. Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed that in class suits involving a multistate
plaintiff class, each plaintiff has incurred injury within the jurisdiction where he resides.
4. Conversely, the larger the class, the smaller the pro rata cost of maintaining the action
to each member of the plaintiff class. See Ross, supra note 1, at 398.
5. In a diversity action, a federal court, in the absence of a federal statute, generally has
no greater in personam jurisdiction than the courts of the state in which it sits. Royal Lace
Paper Works v. Pest Guard Prod., Inc., 240 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1975). See FED. R. Civ.
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cedurally restrictive Supreme Court decisions, however, has effectively
precluded maintenance of such suits in the federal courts. 6 Consumer ad-
vocates have been urging state courts to entertain class suits comprised of a
multistate plaintiff class.7
P. 4(f). Multistate plaintiff classes have been frequently certified in federal courts, however,
because federal class actions typically have arisen in response to violations of statutes which ex-
pressly provide for national service of process. See Fisch, Notice, Costs and the Effect of
Judgment in Missouri's New Common Question Class Action, 38 Mo. L. REV. 173, 211 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Fisch]. For a discussion of the various circumstances under which Con-
gress has provided for nationwide service of process, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1118, 1125 (1969). Since the federal judicial system is unitary
rather than fragmented, a few courts have held that in federal class actions, the multistate
composition of a plaintiff class is irrelevant to the issue of certification. See, e.g., Appelton
Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 140 (7th Cir. 1974); Note, Binding
Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (1954).
6. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1025 (1969), was the first
of four Supreme Court rulings that were hostile to the procedural aspects of consumer class
claims. See Hearings on S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcomm. on Consumer Protection of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1970) ("[tlhe 'promise' of the
federal class action was nipped in the bud by the unfortunate decision in Snyder v. Harris")
(statement of attorney Jay Dushoff). In Snyder, the Court held that the separate and distinct
claims of individual class members could not be combined to satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement of the diversity statute. 394 U.S. at 338. The Court so ruled in spite of the fact
that imposition of such a requirement substantially frustrated the liberal provisions of the
federal class action statute. Id. See Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Plaintiffs in Multistate Class Actions, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 382, 383 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
In Personam Jurisdiction]. Although Snyder left open the possibility that in a diversity suit a
class action could be entertained in federal court if at least one class member had a claim
greater than $10,000, the Court rejected this contention in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973). The Zahn Court held that a class suit seeking pecuniary relief could not
be tried in federal court unless all class members, not just the named representatives, satisfied
the jurisdictional amount requirement. In dictum, the Court further asserted that class actions
invoking federal question jurisdiction must satisfy the same amount in controversy re-
quirements as a class suit brought under diversity jurisdiction unless Congress has exempted
the particular federal question area from meeting this requirement. Id. at 302 n. 11. Unfor-
tunately, few federal statutes which are appropriate for consumer class litigation statutorily ex-
empt the amount in controversy requirement. See Note, Consumer Class Actions with a Multi-
state Class. A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1411, 1415-16 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Consumer Class Actions]. See generally Tornquist, supra note 1, at 60 (listing various
federal statutes which provide for a private right of action absent the amount in controversy
requirement).
The Court further restricted maintenance of federal consumer class suits in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), when it held that not only must notice be given to all iden-
tifiable class members, but the representative plaintiffs must initially finance the cost of this
notice. Due to the large number of individuals typically sought to be included in a consumer
class suit, financing the cost of personal notice to each class member is often prohibitive. See
In Personam Jurisdiction, supra, at 384-85. Most recently, the Supreme Court ruled in
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978), that under most circumstances, if
class members can only be ascertained through investigation, the class representatives must
finance the cost of the investigation.
7. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 20, 428 N.E.2d 478, 485 (1981) (Ryan, J., dis-
senting). See also Delle Donne & Van Horn, supra note 2, at 462-63; Forde, Class Actions in
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Although state courts have long permitted bona fide consumer class ac-
tions that are comprised of a resident plaintiff class,8 only in very limited
circumstances have these courts allowed certification of a plaintiff class that
includes nonresidents. 9 The Illinois courts, which have adjudicated represen-
tative suits'" for over a century," have permitted nonresident absentees to
be members of the plaintiff class only if the nonresidents seeking to be in-
cluded in the class were affiliated with Illinois or if the state had a special
interest in adjudicating their claims.' 2 Other state courts also have been
reluctant to approve certification of a multistate class unless similar circum-
stances are manifest.' 3 Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court veered from
precedent. In Miner v. Gillette Co.,"' the high court condoned certification
of a primarily nonresident plaintiff class even though no special state in-
terest existed to justify adjudicating the claims of nonresident absentees
who lacked any germane contacts with the state.
The Miner decision places Illinois in the forefront of a recent movement'"
which recognizes that different constitutional standards govern the authority
of a state to bind nonresident plaintiffs, as opposed to nonresident defen-
Illinois: Toward a More Attractive Forum for this Essential Remedy, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 211,
213 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Forde].
8. For a discussion of the origins of Illinois class actions, see generally Steinberg v.
Chicago Medical School, 69 II. 2d 320, 335, 371 N.E.2d 634, 641-42 (1977); Tornquist, supra
note 1, at 49.
9. See, e.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977) (absent
a special state interest in adjudicating nonresident claims, these individuals will not be certified
as members of the plaintiff class), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
10. Although the terms representative suit and class suit are used interchangeably in this
Note, the term "representative" generally refers to the named persons initially maintaining the
action. The word "class" refers to all persons whom the named individuals claim to represent.
See Tornquist, supra note 1, at 49. It may be assumed that most, if not all, class members will
never appear before the court.
11. Forde, Illinois' New Class Action Statute, 59 CHI. B. REC. 120 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Forde II].
12. Compare Larson v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Ill. 614, 27 N.E.2d 458 (1940) (full
faith and credit accorded California decree emphasizing that state interest considerations that
exist in disputes involving nonresident contributions to locally situated insurance funds justified
entertainment of multistate class suits) and Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill. App. 483, 101
N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1951) (certification of nonresident plaintiff class appropriate in cir-
cumstances where nonresidents innocently respond to fraudulent solicitation by bogus Illinois
religious corporation because Illinois has interest in rectifying wrong committed by local entity)
with Spirek v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 II1. App. 3d 440, 382 N.E.2d 111 (1st Dist.
1978) (nonresidents who have no affiliation with forum in respect to subject matter of suit can-
not be bound by local adjudication of their interest).
13. See, e.g., Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (App. Div.
1976) (failure to identify state interest in adjudicating claims of individuals who have no ger-
mane contact with forum is grounds for denying these persons membership in plaintiff class).
See generally Consumer Class Action, supra note 6, at 1424-28 (discussing limited situations in
which states have extended their jurisdictional authority beyond their geographic boundaries).
14. 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981).
15. See infra notes 41-51, 58-69 and accompanying text.
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dants, to a class action judgment. Unlike other decisions of this genre,"
however, the Miner court concluded that as long as nonresidents are
notified of the action and their interests are adequately protected by party
respresentatives, these individuals may be included in the plaintiff class
irrespective of traditional limitations on state jurisdictional authority.'
BACKGROUND
Because most consumer class actions have been effectively barred from
the federal forum, state courts hear such suits with increasing frequency.'"
Generally, the procedural obstacles for maintaining such suits in state
courts are less troublesome than those encountered in the federal system. '9
Despite the procedural advantages that may be realized by maintaining a
class action in state court, the judgment will not be accorded full faith and
credit in sister states unless the court establishes jurisdiction over the parties.20
A substantial body of case law has evolved concerning the jurisdictional
prerequisites that must be met to secure jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants. A dispute has arisen, however, in regard to whether these same
16. E.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977) (in contrast
to nonclass suits, nonresident plaintiffs in class actions need only receive various due process
protections to be bound by a local judgment if the state has a special state interest in ad-
judicating their claims), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978) (although some germane contact must be identified
between nonresident defendants and the forum in order for these individuals to be personally
subject to the court's jurisdiction, nonresident plaintiffs in a class suit may be included as
members of the plaintiff class despite their lack of contact with the forum).
17. 87 111. 2d at 15, 428 N.E.2d at 482-83 (1981).
18. See Delle Donne & Van Horn, supra note 2, at 462-63; Tornquist, supra note 1, at 46.
19. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969) (diversity suits involving state law issues
best entertained in state courts). Some states that have adopted liberal versions of the federal
rules may have class action procedures so efficacious that actions similar to those attempted in
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), and Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973), could theoretically be entertained in their courts. Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Ac-
tions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 HARV. L. REV. 718, 718-19 & n.9 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions]. There is no jurisdictional amount requirement to
contend with at the state trial court level. Fisch, supra note 5, at 178. In addition, Illinois and
three other states have enacted streamlined class action statutes that explicitly reject the strict
personal notice requirement imposed by Eisen on federal class suits seeking pecuniary relief.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.4 (1979); N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 904
(McKinney 1976); PA. R. Civ. P. 1712.
20. Prior to adoption of the fourteenth amendment, it was well established that judgments
purporting to dispose of personal or property interests would not be enforced outside the
forum if jurisdiction over the property or the parties had not initially been secured. See D'Arcy
v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850). The rule remained unchanged as due process
limitations on state jurisdictional authority evolved. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 94 U.S. 714, 729-33
(1877); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4467 (1969).
It must be noted that the legal interests of unnamed class members are affected by any class
action properly brought on their behalf which results in a final adjudication. Irrespective of the
outcome of such a suit, those included in the plaintiff class will be barred from relitigating the
suit in another forum. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 241-42 (1979).
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jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied to bind nonresident plaintiffs
to a class action adjudication of their interests. 21 To understand the con-
troversy, it is instructive to examine the jurisdictional principles involved in
determining when jurisdiction can be secured over a nonresident defendant.
The Minimum Contacts Legacy of
International Shoe and Shaffer
As a consequence of the residual sovereignty each state exercises in the
federal scheme, state courts historically have confined their power to ad-
judicate controversies to objects or persons physically present within their
boundaries.22 Endorsed by the Supreme Court more than a century ago in
Pennoyer v. Neff,2 this territorial imperative eventually spawned unfair
results as radical improvements in transportation, commerce, and com-
munication repudiated the notion that only persons or things physically present
within the confines of a state's borders were so sufficiently related with the
forum that jurisdiction could be exercised over them.24
As the cosmopolitan character of American society escalated, the tradi-
tional territorial limitations imposed upon the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion were relaxed, and state courts began to reach outside their forum to
adjudicate the increasingly common disputes involving foreign defendants.2"
21. Compare Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (App. Div.
1976) (requirements for securing jurisdiction over nonresidents in class actions are identical, ir-
respective of their status as plaintiffs or defendants) with Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222
Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978) (plaintiff class members
may be bound by state court determination of their interests even though conditions may be in-
sufficient to secure binding jurisdiction over nonresident defendants).
22. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
249-50 (1958). If a court's jurisdiction is based on the power it has to render the defendant
personally liable to plaintiff, the action is designated in personam. In contrast, if a court'sjurisdictional authority in a given case only encompasses property located within the territorial
confines of the forum, the action is designated in rem or quasi in rem. Any judgment awarded
plaintiff in actions in rem or quasi in rem may be satisfied only by distribution of the property
which intitially provided the jurisdictional basis. Moreover, since the property owner is not
before the court, the court cannot hold the defendant personally liable. Note that while an ac-
tion in rem affects the interests of all persons in certain property, an action quasi in rem only
affects the interests of named parties in particular property. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 199 (1977). For a general discussion of all three types of jurisdiction, see Note,
Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 935-65 (1960).
23. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
24. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957). The McGee
Court elaborated on the substantial role technology has played in the evolution of statejurisdictional authority. It should be pointed out that corresponding to the heightened national
character of commercial activity, improvements in transportation and communciation have
made it far less burdensome for an individual to defend himself in a foreign jurisdiction with
which he has been affiliated. Id. at 223.
25. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). In Hess, the Court upheld a Massa-
chusetts statute which appointed a state official as an agent for service of process for all
nonresident motorists involved in accidents within the state, thereby subjecting these
nonresidents to the state's jurisdiction. Because nonresident motorists could theoretically be ex-
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
By 1945, the Court had established that to determine whether a state court
may make a binding in personam 26 judgment over a nonresident defendant,
the primary inquiry concerned whether assertion of jurisdiction was both
fair and reasonable rather than discerning whether the defendant was merely
physically present within the geographical borders of the state.27 In Inter-
national Shoe v. Washington, 2 the Court stated that what was fair and
reasonable would be determined by an objective standard; nonresidents
who had certain "minimum contacts" with the forum such that mainten-
ance of the suit did not offend traditional concepts of due process would be
considered personally subject to the jurisdiction of the forum court.29
Following International Shoe, the inquiry concerning state authority to
establish jurisdiction over nonresident defendants shifted dramatically. The
Supreme Court's preoccupation with the mutually exclusive sovereignty of
the states3" was superseded by an emphasis on the extent to which the
defendant, the litigation, and the forum were interrelated.' In Shaffer v.
Heitner,32 the Court emphasized that adherence to this tripartite scheme
mandated that actions in rem33 as well as in personam be governed by In-
ternational Shoe's minimum contacts doctrine.3" Consequently, the presence
of property within the forum was no longer independently sufficient to afford
the court jurisdiction to attach such property. Rather, property within the
state could only be attached if it bore such a significant relationship to both
the subject matter of the suit and the forum that the court's exercise of
jurisdiction over it would not offend due process."
Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have proclaimed the con-
tinued vitality of the minimum contacts doctrine enunciated in International
Shoe and Shaffer, but always in the context of litigation directed against a
nonresident defendant who challenges the forum state's authority to subject
either his person or property to jurisdiction.3" Thus, the Supreme Court has
cluded from Massachusetts highways, the Court reasoned that by using the state's roads, these
individuals had constructively consented to appoint an agent for service of process within the
jurisdiction. Id. at 356-57.
26. See supra note 22.
27. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 316.
30. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). For a discussion of Pennoyer, see supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
31. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
32. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
33. See supra note 22.
34. 433 U.S. at 209, 212 (1977).
35. Id. at 209.
36. Theoretically, the Shaffer Court extended the scope of the minimum contacts doctrine
to include class suits involving nonresident plaintiffs when it declared that "all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny." 433 U.S. at 212. It can be argued, however, that three years after Shaf-
fer, the Court, in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980), qualified this language as ap-
plicable solely to manifestation of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Rush concerned
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never specifically addressed the issue of whether the minimum contacts
criteria must be satisfied where plaintiffs, rather than defendants, are
sought to be bound by a foreign state court judgment. A few courts have
argued, however, that the Supreme Court has implied that it is unimportant
to discern minimum contacts between foreign plaintiffs and the forum in
order to bind these nonresidents to class adjudications of their claims.
State Interest and Minimum Contacts
in the Absent Plaintiff Context
Generally, a person who is before the court but is not a named party will
not be bound by the court's judgment.3" Persons included in the plaintiff
class in a representative action, however, may be bound by the judgment
even though they are outside the jurisdiction of the court.3" This distinction
between class and nonclass suits was endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Hansberry v. Lee.39 It was this endorsement that spawned the dispute con-
the issue of whether an insurer's duty to defend a nonresident policyholder could be
characterized as a cotingent debt subject to the quasi in rem jurisdiction of a state in which the
insurer did business. Id. at 322. See supra note 22. The Rush Court held that permitting
jurisdiction in such circumstances would violate the minimum contacts requirements of Inter-
national Shoe and Shaffer. 444 U.S. 320, 327-33 (1980). In concert with Rush, the Court reaf-
firmed the sovereign right of state courts to hear suits arising within the borders of the state in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The World-Wide Court held
that concomitant with this right, under the minimum contacts doctrine, states could not secure
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who had not purposefully availed themselves of the
benefits of the state's laws in such a manner that they could reasonably anticipate being haled
into the state's courts. Id. at 297.
37. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-42 (1940).
38. Id. See Frank v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 71 Ill. 2d 583, 592, 376 N.E.2d 1377,
1380 (1978); Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 90, 55 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1944);
Comment, Class Actions and the Illinois Consumer, 4 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 217, 226-27
(1971). See also, 3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.11[5] (2d ed. 1981) (fact that
members of class are beyond territorial limits of court is immaterial as to binding effect of
judgment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(2) (1980) (person represented by party to
action is bound by judgment even though person does not have notice of action, is not served
with process, or is not subject to service of process).
39. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). In dicta, the Hansberry Court remarked:
To these general rules [concerning personal jurisdiction] there is a recognized ex-
ception that, to an extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion, the judgment in
a "class" or "representative" suit, to which some members of the class are parties,
may bind members of the class or those represented who were not made parties to
it . . . [or] are not within the jurisdiction. . . . In such cases where the interests of
those not joined are of the same class as the interests of those who are, and where
it is considered that the latter fairly represent the former ... the court will proceed
to a decree.
Id. at 41-42. Class action advocates argue that the above language demonstrates that as long as
nonresident plaintiff absentees are adequately represented, they cannot assert that they are not
bound by the judgment of the adjudicating court. See Forde II, supra note 11, at 133; Note,
Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction Over Class Action, 56 TEX. L.
REV. 1033, 1045, 1048-49 (1978) [hereinafter cited as State Court Jurisdiction]. In response,
skeptics maintain that Hansberry should not be so liberally construed because it did not in-
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cerning the propriety of employing a minimum contacts approach to ascer-
tain whether nonresident plaintiffs may be bound by state class action
judgments."' Essentially, the controversy is focused on whether a class suit
is to be considered merely a procedural device wholly incapable of expand-
ing the territorial confines of a state's sovereignty, or whether the unique
nature of class suits warrants utilization of a constitutional standard dif-
ferent than that historically thought necessary to establish jurisdiction over
nonresidents.
Some authorities assert that the Hansberry decision stands for the propo-
sition that as long as a special state interest exists to adjudicate nonresident
claims, an absent plaintiff who has no contacts with the forum may be
bound by a judgment rendered there provided that various procedural due
process protections"' are afforded.4 1 Courts adopting this view emphasize
that policy considerations underlying the utilization of the class action
mechanism support such an interpretation. 3
volve a representative action and "its broad pronouncements of the requirements of due pro-
cess in class actions are rank dicta." Maraist & Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage:
Due Process and the Class Action, 49 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Maraist &
Sharp].
40. Compare Impact, supra note 2, at 1011 (discerning minimum contacts between plaintiff
class members and forum important in determining whether absentees bound by local judg-
ment) with Consumer Class Actions, supra note 6, at 1432-33 (utilization of minimum contacts
analysis irrelevant in ascertaining whether absentees may be certified as members of plaintiff
class).
41. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
42. See Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 542-43, 567 P.2d 1292, 1305-06
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978); Ross, supra note 1, at 409, 412; Consumer Class
Actions, supra note 6, at 1432-33. See generally ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
CLASS ACTIONS § 8.15 (1979).
43. Because the purpose of a class suit is to conserve judicial resources by redressing the in-
juries sustained by a large number of similarly situated individuals in a single proceeding, territorial
restrictions on joinder of plaintiff class members inhibit class suits from realizing their full
potential. See Ross, supra note 1, at 421. There are additional arguments for construing the
Hansberry decision broadly and distinguishing class suits from other actions for jurisdictional
purposes.
Unlike class representatives, absentees bear none of the risks of maintaining the suit. See
Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 19, at 726-27. In the event the court renders a
judgment adverse to their interests, absentees cannot be subjected to counterclaims or court
costs because they are not parties. Cf. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58
F.R.D. 485, 488-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant cannot counterclaim against individual class
members until these individuals either appear and claim interest in recovery or defendant
manages to bring defendant class action against entire plaintiff class). Moreover, fairness con-
cerns suggest the inappropriateness of applying minimum contacts criterion in the context of
plaintiff class actions. In contrast to a defendant who is subject to suit in a foreign state, an
absentee class member is adequately represented and need not travel to the forum to protect
his interests. See Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 19, at 727. Further, in con-
sumer class suits, the nonresident plaintiff's interest in the litigation will be de minimus, see
McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and
Substance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1351, 1392 (1974), and unless procedural
due process protections prove inadequate, the absentee's interests will be vigorously promoted
by the class representatives. See Forde 11, supra note 11, at 127.
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The Kansas Supreme Court, in Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,"4 was
the first court to legitimize this interpretation of the Hansberry decision.
Shutts involved a class action suit filed to recover lost interest earned on
overdue royalties attributed to natural gas produced from mineral leases in
a three state area. The majority of the leases concerned mineral rights
located within Kansas,"' although most members of the plaintiff class were
nonresidents.46 In its opinion, the Kansas court declared that because
representative suits, by definition, proceed to judgment despite the absence
of most class members, the multistate composition of the plaintiff class was
irrelevant in determining whether personal jurisdiction could be established
over the entire class.4'7 The relevant factor was the extent to which nonresi-
dent plaintiffs were given an opportunity to be heard and were adequately
protected by those representing their interests.4" Satisfaction of both of
these due process guarantees qualified the multistate plaintiff class for cer-
tification.4 9 The Shutts court cautioned, however, that even though a
Indeed, a distinction can be drawn between the binding effect a judgment may have on a
defendant as opposed to a plaintiff class member. While the effect of a judgment against a
defendant is to deprive him of property rights protected by the due process clause, see
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1403-04 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Developments], a judgment adverse to the interests of plaintiff class members merely
precludes these indiviiduals from relitigating the issues actually decided in the prior action. See
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 26 comment a, § 86 comment a (1942); Ross, supra note 1, at
412. A judgment adverse to class interests is res judicata only if a collateral attack concerning
the adequacy of the class representation proves unsuccessful. See Multistate Plaintiff Class Ac-
tions, supra note 19, at 721-28; Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action
Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REV. 589 (1974). Proponents of class suits contend that the Supreme
Court has never held that the right to maintain an action in an individual capacity is a property right
protected by the due process clause. See Developments, supra at 1404. But see Comment, The
Heirs of Boddie: Court Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 571, 586-87 (1973). Consequently, class action advocates argue that since the remedy af-
forded persons participating in representative suits conceivably provides constitutionally suffi-
cent protection of their substantive claims, see, e.g., Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516,
532 (1907) (representation by corporation in class suit adequately protects shareholders in-
terests), due process hardly seems offended if a court seeks to bind nonresident plaintiffs who
have already received one chance to litigate their claims. See Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions,
supra note 19, at 728; State Court Jurisdictions, supra note 39, at 1044-45 & n.67.
44. 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
45. Id. at 557, 567 P.2d at 1314.
46. Of approximately 6,400 plaintiff class members, 218 were Kansas residents. Id. at 532,
541, 567 P.2d at 1298, 1304.
47. Id. at 542, 567 P.2d at 1305.
48. Id. The Shutts court concluded that although the necessary element to securing jurisdic-
tion over nonresidernt defendants is some minimum contact between the defendant and the
forum, the necessary element to establishing personal jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs in
a class action is compliance with the dual elements of procedural due process-notice and ade-
quate representation. Id. at 542-43, 567 P.2d at 1305.
49. Id. The components of procedural due process identified in Shutts are derived from
three Supreme Court opinions. In Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914), the Court held
that a party's opportunity to be heard was a fundamental requisite of due process. The Court
recognized in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950),
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multistate class suit satisfied the dual requirements of procedural due pro-
cess, the suit might not be entertained if the state had no special interest in
hearing the suit."0 The Kansas court certified the multistate plaintiff class in
Shutts because it found that the majority of gas leases were located within
the forum, and thus, the state had a special interest in adjudicating the
nonresident claims.
51
In contrast to Shutts, other authorities have stressed that despite the
Court's language in Hansberry v. Lee, the key determinant of whether
nonresident absentees can be included as members of the plaintiff class is
the extent to which the absentees are affiliated with the forum. 2 This was
however, that absent an opportunity to receive notice of an action, a party would be deprived
of his fundamental right to be heard. Consequently, the Mullane Court held that notice,
calculated to apprise parties of the pendancy of the action was a fundamental requirement of
due process. Id. at 314. Mullane was not a class action, however, and absentee plaintiffs in
class suits are not named parties to the actions. Prior to Mullane, the Court had held in
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940), that adequate representation of absentee plain-
tiffs' interests was a due process prerequisite to maintenance of a class action. A few courts
have held that, taken together, Hansberry and Mullane mandate that the greater the degree of
similarity among absentee and representative interests, the less important it is for all iden-
tifiable class members to receive personal notice. See, e.g., Frank v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n, 71 Ill.,2d 583, 593, 376 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (1978); Hoover v. May Dep't Stores Co., 62
I1l. App. 3d 106, 118-20, 378 N.E.2d 762, 772-74 (5th Dist. 1978).
In attempting to delineate the due process implications of Mullane and Hansberry on class
actions, two authors arrived at a similar conclusion. They stressed that even without actual
notice and a corresponding opportunity to participate in a class suit, due process may never-
theless be satisified if:
(1) there is a compelling state interest to adjudicate the suit, or
(2) the interests of absentees are adequately represented by named class members
and either
(a) the absentees expressly or impliedly "consented" to be represented by the
named parties, or
(b) adjudication of the absentee claims will further a special state interest
and issuance of notice would make maintenance of the suit imprac-
ticable.
Maraist & Sharp, supra note 39, at 9. But see infra note 90.
50. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 550, 557, 567 P.2d 1292, 1310, 1314-15
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978). The Shutts court referred to Feldman v. Bates Mfg.
Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 862 A.2d 1177 (App. Div. 1976), as an example of a factual situation
in which a court should refuse to certify a multistate plaintiff class. 222 Kan. at 557, 567 P.2d
at 1314. The facts in Feldman significantly differed from those in Shutts. First, unlike Shutts,
the Feldman court had no special interest in adjudicating the suit on behalf of a multistate
class. Id. at 550, 567 P.2d at 1310. Second, while the plaintiff class in Feldman was comprised
of individuals living in numerous states, only residents of three jurisdictions were involved in
the Shuns litigation. Id. at 545, 550, 567 P.2d at 1307, 1310. Third, Shutts was distinguishable
from Feldman because, in contrast to the New Jersey situation, Kansas was the only state in
the Shutts case where the statute of limitations had not elapsed. The Kansas court reasoned
that maintenance of a multistate class suit would toll the statute of limitations on behalf of
nonresident class members who otherwise would be unable to obtain relief. Id. at 545, 567
P.2d at 1307.
51. Id. at 557-58, 567 P.2d at 1314-15.
52. See Spirek v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 I1. App. 3d 440, 453, 382 N.E.2d
111, 120 (1st Dist. 1978); Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 89-94, 362 A.2d
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the position taken in Feldman v. Bates Manufacturing Co.," where the Ap-
pellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court emphasized that absent
"affiliating circumstances," such as when nonresidents share in a common
fund located within the forum, state courts could not assert personal
jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiff class members unless the state main-
tained a special interest in assuming the burden of adjudicating their
claims."' Because the defendant in Feldman had no assets within the forum
1177, 1179-82 (App. Div. 1976); Fisch, supra note 5, at 209, 212; Vestal & Scher, Uniform
Class Actions: A Critical View, 63 A.B.A. J. 837, 842 (1977); Multistate Plaintiff Class Ac-
tions, supra note 19, at 723-25.
Prior to Miner, in instances where no special state interest in adjudicating nonresident
claims exists, it was uniformly required that absent plaintiffs in class suits have minimum contacts
with the forum in order to be bound by a local adjudication of their interests. Some commen-
tators argue that those who claim procedural due process is a substitute for minimum contacts
in the class action context have failed to address the territorial issue in light of jurisdictional
concerns. See Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 19, at 729. These commentators
believe territorial restrictions are more than just primitive means of protecting against imposi-
tion of burdensome litigation. Id. They emphasize that prior to adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, territorial restrictions alone governed whether state judgments received full faith
and credit in sister states. See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850). Despite the
fact that subsequent to the amendment's ratification due process concerns for ensuring fairness
to the litgants have gradually become an important factor in ascertaining whether jurisdiction
over absent parties can be secured, see supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text, many
authorities believe territoriality necessarily plays a significant part in every inquiry concerning
state jurisdictional authority because states are still residually sovereign entities in the federal
scheme. See Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 19, at 729. Cf. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980) (it would be inconsistent with
constitutional principles of interstate federalism to hold that state lines are irrelevant in
delineating state jurisdictional authority). Consequently, it has been suggested that minimum
contacts be viewed not as a wholesale disavowal of territorial imperatives, but merely as a
more sensible alternative than "presence" for implementing due process concerns. See
Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 19, at 729. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 4, reporter's note at 63 (1980) (real issue is not whether jurisdictional concept is
territorial but whether conception of territorial authority should be formulated in physical or
mechanical terms).
Moreover, the Uniform Class Action Act [hereinafter cited as Act], promulgated in part to
facilitate the ability of state courts to hear representative suits involving nonresident claims, see
UNIF. CLASS ACTION ACT, prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 1982), does not challenge the
propriety of demonstrating minimum contacts between the forum and all nonresident plaintiffs
to validly bind these individuals to a local judgment. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 22,
428 N.E.2d 478, 486 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting); Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra
note 19, at 722. Rather, the Act seeks to harmonize territoriality with the necessity of enter-
taining class suits of a multistate character. It provides that if no minimum contacts exist, a
state may establish jurisdiction over any nonresident whose home state has reciprocal statutory
jurisdictional authority over residents of the forum. UNIF. CLASS ACTION ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A.
24 (1976). Thus, whether the Act will significantly increase the number of state courts that hear
class suits involving nonresident plaintiffs is dependent on the number of states in which it is
eventually adopted. See Moore, Uniform Class Action Act: Does it Go Far Enough?, 63
A.B.A. J. 837, 844 (1977). Presently, only North Dakota has adopted the Act's reciprocal
jurisdictional provision. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 23(0.
53. 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (App. Div. 1976).
54. Id. at 90-92, 362 A.2d at 1180-81. A few courts have denied certification of a national
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and was not licensed to do business in the state," and because the great ma-
jority of those sought to be included in the plaintiff class were nonresidents
who had no germane contact with the forum, 6 the court refused to certify
the nonresident plaintiff class. 7
Two years after Feldman, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted the Shutts approach in Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. ," In
Schlosser, a multistate class of retired employees sued their employer for
breach of its contractual obligation to provide free life insurance benefits to
class members older than sixty-five. The Wisconsin court stated that it was
inappropriate to utilize a minimum contacts approach to determine whether
the nonresident plaintiff class members could be bound by a local adjudica-
tion of their interests. 9 Rather, the court maintained that as long as
nonresident plaintiffs received due process protections and the state had a
special interest in adjudicating their claims, the nonresidents could be cer-
tified as members of the plaintiff class.60
The Wisconsin court identified a substantial state interest in adjudicating
the nonresident claims.' Unlike the situation in either Shutts or Feldman,
the defendant in Schlosser not only maintained its corporate headquarters
in the forum, 62 but the majority of class members lived within the forum
state as well.63 Furthermore, the Schlosser court emphasized that the
disputed contract provision originated in the defendant's Wisconsin office.6 4
Consequently, despite the fact that the remainder of the plaintiff class were
plaintiff class on slightly different territorial grounds. See, e.g., Klemow v. Time, Inc., 466 Pa.
189, 352 A.2d 12 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1977). Klemow was a class action for
specific performance brought on behalf of Life Magazine subscribers to compel the near
bankrupt magazine to continue publishing until all class member subscriptions had expired.
The court summarily stated that because the jurisdiction of the commonwealth courts was ter-
ritorially limited, only residents or nonresidents submitting themselves to the court's jurisdic-
tion could be included in the plaintiff class. Id. at 197 n.15, 352 A.2d at 16 n.15. See also
Reardon v. Ford Motor Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519 (3d Dist. 1972) (court refused
to certify a multistate plaintiff class consisting of four million Ford automobile owners whose
vehicles were allegedly equipped with defective suspension systems). Because each transaction
that culminated in the purchase of a vehicle would have its own unique history, and because
various defenses as well as procedural and evidentiary questions would vary nationwide, the
Reardon court held that the representative parties should not be allowed to litigate the claims
of nonresident absentees who might wish to seek relief in their home forum. Id. at 344, 287
N.E.2d at 524.
55. 143 N.J. Super. 84, 92, 362 A.2d 1177, 1181 (App. Div. 1976).
56. Of the 295 individuals sought to be included in the plaintiff class, only 32 were New
Jersey residents. Id. at 88, 362 A.2d at 1179.
57. Id. at 94, 362 A.2d at 1182.
58. 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978).
59. Id. at 242, 271 N.W.2d at 887.
60. Id. at 241-43, 271 N.W.2d at 886-87.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 242-43, 271 N.W.2d at 887.
63. Id. at 239, 271 N.W.2d at 885. Of the 562 members of the plaintiff class, 323 were
Wisconsin residents. Id.
64. Id. at 240-41, 271 N.W.2d at 886.
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residents of twenty-three foreign jurisdictions who had no contact with the
forum,6 the court asserted that adjudication of their interests in a Wiscon-
sin forum would receive full faith and credit in sister states. 66
The varied positions of the state courts illustrate the division of authority
concerning what significance, if any, minimum contacts should play in the
process of certifying a multistate plaintiff class. Until recently, all states
subscribed to the proposition that a special state interest must exist for a
state to adjudicate the interests of nonresident absentees who have no ger-
mane affiliation with the forum. In 1981, however, the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected this proposition in Miner v. Gillette Co., holding that com-
pliance with procedural due process was all that was constitutionally re-
quired to certify a multistate plaintiff class in a state class action pro-
ceeding. 67
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
In April 1978, the Gillette Company, a Delaware corporation headquar-
tered in Massachusetts68 and licensed to do business in Illinois, 69 initiated a
national campaign to promote sales of its "Cricket" brand disposable
butane lighters. 0 In various advertisements, Gillette offerred "Accent"
brand table lighters to persons submitting proof of purchase of two Cricket
lighters, along with fifty cents for postage and handling.7' Nearly 500,000
people sent for the Accent lighters, but Gillette was unable to fill approx-
imately 180,000 of the orders.72
Steven Miner, one of nearly 12,000 Illinois residents who failed to receive
an Accent lighter after responding to Gillette's offer,73 filed a two-count
class action suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging that the
company's failure! to comply with the terms of its unconditional offer con-
stituted both a breach of contract 7 and a violation of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.75  Miner not only sought
65. Id. at 239, 271 N.W.2d at 885.
66. Id. at 242 & n.3, 271 N.W.2d at 887 & n.3.
67. 87 Ill. 2d 7, 15-16, 428 N.E.2d 478, 482-83 (1981).
68. Id. at 24, 428 N.E.2d at 487 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
69. Appellant's Petition for Leave to Appeal at 21, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 I11. 2d 7, 428
N.E.2d 478 (1981).
70. Brief for Appellee at 8, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981).
71. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, 1 4, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 I11. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d
478 (1981).
72. 87 II1. 2d at 11, 428 N.E.2d at 480. Gillette sent a written apology to all who applied
for, but failed to receive, an Accent lighter. Id. at 15, 428 N.E.2d at 482. In addition, the
company mailed each applicant a Cricket lighter in consolation. Id.
73. Id. at 22, 428 N.E.2d at 486.
74. Id. at 10, 428 N.E.2d at 480.
75. Id. See Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, §§ 1-12, ILL.'REv. STAT.
ch. 1212, §§ 261-272 (1979). Enacted in 1961 and amended in 1973, the Consumer Fraud Act
gave Illinois consumers an unprecedented right to sue those doing business within the state for
various fraudulent practices. In the instant case, Miner asserted that although Gillette knew it
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redress on behalf of all Illinois residents allegedly injured by Gillette's pro-
motion, but also on behalf of all individuals similarly injured nationwide.",
Few of the nonresidents sought to be included in the action had minimum
contacts with Illinois in respect to the subject matter of the suit," and
Gillette strenuously denied that a class action comprised of multistate plain-
tiffs could be entertained in such circumstances. In the absence of minimum
contacts between nonresident absentees and the forum, Gillette reasoned
that not only would Illinois have no interest in adjudicating the claims of
nonresident class members, but that any judgment rendered by the Illinois
tribunal would have no binding effect outside the state's borders."
Acknowledging these arguments, the circuit court entered an interlocutory
order limiting the plaintiff class solely to Illinois residents. 9 In accordance
with one of its previous decisions, 0 the Appellate Court for the First
Judicial District affirmed the circuit court order." Subsequently, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court order holding that denial of class
certification to nonresident plaintiffs was improper.82
REASONING OF THE COURT
At the outset, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that different constitu-
tional considerations govern a court's ability to secure jurisdiction over
had an insufficient supply of Accent lighters to meet the anticipated demand, it fraudulently
induced the plaintiff class to purchase thousands of Cricket lighters by fostering the belief that
an adequate supply of the lighters was available. See Appellant's Petition for Leave to Appeal
at 20, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 II1. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981).
76. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, 9, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d
478 (1981). Gillette submitted a supplemental affidavit illustrating the breakdown, by state, of
all who applied for, but failed to receive an Accent lighter. The breakdown demonstrated that
Illinois residents comprised 6.5% of the total number of individuals allegedly injured by
Gillette's promotion nationwide. See Supplemental Affidavit, Corrections to Answers to Plain-
tiff's First Set of Interrogatories, Exhibit A, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 487
(1981). More injured class members lived in California than Illinois. Moreover, almost as many
Texas and New York residents were injured as were Illinois residents. Id.
In Massachusetts, where Gillette maintained its corporate headquarters, about 4,000 people
failed to receive lighters that they had applied for. In Minnesota, the state where Gillette had
directed all monies solicited to be sent, approximately 2,000 individuals did not receive Accent
lighters. Nearly 700 persons unsuccessfully responded to Gillette's promotion in Delaware, the
state in which Gillette was incorporated. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 106-10.
77. 87 III. 2d at 12, 428 N.E.2d at 481.
78. See Brief for Appellee at 22, 30, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 I11. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478
(1981). Moreover, Gillette claimed that approval of a national plaintiff class would cause the
case to be virtually unmanageable because the court would have to undertake the burdensome
task of evaluating the company's liability in light of the particular contract and consumer pro-
tection laws in each of the 50 states. Id. at 22-26.
79. Miner v. Gillette Co., 79 CH 567 (Cir. Ct. Cook County) (Order of Sept. 17, 1979).
80. See Spirek v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 Ill. App. 3d 440, 382 N.E.2d 111 (1st
Dist. 1978) (certification denied nonresident absentees lacking minimum contacts with the
forum in respect to the subject matter of the suit).
81. Miner v. Gillette Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 315, 319, 411 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (1st Dist. 1980).
82. 87 11. 2d at 20, 428 N.E.2d at 485.
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nonresident plaintiffs, as opposed to nonresident defendants in class suits.3
Specifically, the Miner court endorsed the Kansas Supreme Court's view
that although the necessary ingredient to obtaining in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant is the existence of some minimum contact bet-
ween the defendant, the litigation, and the forum, in a class action the ex-
istence of such contact to garner jurisdiction over a nonresident plaintiff
was not essential.8 ' The Miner court reasoned that this distinction was war-
ranted because class suits are an anomaly within the American judicial
scheme. Unlike plaintiffs in a nonclass action, absent plaintiffs in a class
action may obtain relief even though they do not appear before the court.
Based on this difference, the court argued that there was little reason to
distinguish between resident and nonresident plaintiffs on a territorial,
minimum contact basis.8" The Illinois court liberally interpreted the
Hansberry 1 decision which had recognized that unique standards govern
assertion of jurisdiction over absentee class members in representative
suits. 7
The Illinois court opined that recognition of the distinction between class
and nonclass actions with respect to plaintiffs necessitates a reevaluation of
the procedural due process guarantees of fairness that govern the ability of
a state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over absent individuals. The
Miner court reasoned that, while fairness to a nonresident defendant re-
quired that there be some germane contact with the forum in order to be
haled into court, fairness to a nonresident plaintiff in a class suit simply re-
quired that the nonresident receive sufficient notice of the action and that
the class representatives adequately represent the absent plaintiff's
interests.8"
In its analysis, the Miner court found that these procedural due process
guarantees were readily satisfied by the nonresident plaintiff class. Ade-
quate representation was apparently not threatened because the claims of
83. Id. at 12, 428 N.E.2d at 481.
84. Id. at 12-14, 428 N.E.2d at 481-82. The court relied on Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 241-42, 271 N.W.2d 879, 886-87 (1978) (compliance with procedural
due process eliminates need to utilize minimum contact approach in determining whether
multistate plaintiff class may be certified), as further support for this contention.
85. 87 Ill. 2d at 14, 428 N.E.2d at 482. The Miner court stressed that employment of the
class action mechanism was predicated on the judiciary's inability to hear the claims of all class
members individually as well as the impracticality of requiring all class members to individually
prosecute their claims. Because the purpose underlying utilization of the class action device is
judicial efficiency, the court reasoned that requiring absent class members to have contact with
the forum, despite the fact that those persons may never appear personally to share in the
recovery, would nonsensically frustrate the efficiency of maintaining such suits. Id. As one
commentator urged, to hold otherwise would be to toss the "substantive baby out of court
with the procedural bathwater." Ross, supra note 1, at 427. But see infra notes 99-104 and ac-
companying text.
86. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940).
87. 87 Il. 2d at 13-14, 428 N.E.2d at 481-82. For the specific passage in Hansberry upon
which the Miner court anchored its decision, see supra note 39.
88. 87 Ill. 2d at 14, 428 N.E.2d at 482.
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the nonresident plaintiffs were identical to those of their Illinois counter-
parts. 9 In addition, because Gillette knew the name and address of each
plaintiff, the court reasoned that all plaintiffs could receive notice of the
impending action.90 The court emphasized that as long as the due process
requirements of notice and representation were met, a judgment in a multi-
state class action would be honored in other states under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution,91 thereby, binding all class
members who did not affirmatively drop out of the class.9 2 Provided that
the plaintiffs could satisfy the statutory criteria for maintaining a class ac-
tion, 93 the court concluded that compliance with procedural due process
89. Id. at 15, 428 N.E.2d at 482.
90. Id. Nevertheless, the Miner court implied that lack of notice would not always defeat
multistate class suits. Although the court said individual notice is mandated when the names
and addresses of nonresident plaintiff class members are known, "[t]he question of what
notice must be given to absent class members to satisfy due process necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the individual action." Id.
Prior to Miner, Illinois was one of only a few states to excuse pretrial or prejudgment
notice to absent but identifiable class members. See Hoover v. May Dep't Stores Co., 62 Ill.
App. 3d 106, 118-20, 378 N.E.2d 762, 772-74 (5th Dist. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 77 Ill.
2d 93, 395 N.E.2d 541 (1979); Tornquist, supra note 1, at 74. Further, the Illinois class action
statute, enacted in 1977, makes notice discretionary with the court. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 2-803 (1981). Historically, Illinois courts have justified this departure from conventional
notice by emphasizing that vigorous prosecution of class claims by representative parties suffi-
ciently protects the interests of absent class members. In general, only if representation appears
inadequate will the courts order notice to be made. See Frank v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n, 71 III. 2d 583, 589-96, 376 N.E.2d 1377, 1379-82 (1978); Forde II, supra note 11, at
131-32. See also supra note 49. Other jurisdictions have been more reluctant to waive notice of
an action to persons whose interests are being adjudicated, particularly because notice "is the
greatest single safeguard against inadequate representation." Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
222 Kan. 527, 556, 567 P.2d 1292, 1314 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978) (quoting
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). The proposed Uniform
Class Action Act, see supra note 52, assumes an intermediate position; only those persons
whose claims exceed $100 must receive personal notice of the action. UNIFORM CLASS ACTION
ACT. § 7d, 12 U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1982).
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
92. 87 I1. 2d at 15-16, 428 N.E.2d at 483.
93. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-801 (1981). The requirements for class action certifica-
tion in Illinois are:
1. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
2. There are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common ques-
tions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.
3. The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the
class.
4. The class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy.
Id.
Refuting Gillette's contention that maintenance of a national plaintiff class suit was un-
manageable because the multifarious laws of 50 jurisdictions had to be applied to the dispute,
see supra note 78, the Miner court recognized that the Illinois class action statute, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, § 2-802 (1981), provided for grouping of class suits into manageable subclasses.
87 111. 2d at 17-18, 428 N.E.2d at 484. The court also found that the statutory provision which
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would eliminate arty further objection to certification of a national plaintiff
class in Illinois.9
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
All courts, including those who have asserted that compliance with pro-
cedural due process obviates the need for minimum contacts between non-
residents and the forum, have stressed that nonresidents will not be bound
by a local judgment unless a special state interest exists in adjudicating their
claims.95 The rationale for this rule is anchored to federalist concerns. As a
consequence of the residual sovereignty each state enjoys as a co-equal
member of the Union,96 state courts are reluctant to usurp the right of
another jurisdiction to hear suits arising within its own borders.97 There-
fore, unless a special state interest in adjudicating nonresident claims is
identified, the imposition of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be a constitu-
tional violation of the full faith and credit clause. 8
requires common questions of fact or law to be the predominating focus of the class action,
see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-801 (1981), was satisfied because the claims of both resident
and nonresident plaintiffs were factually identical. 87 Ill. 2d at 17, 428 N.E.2d at 483. The
court held that if, on remand, Miner could establish that the differing state laws were subject
to being grouped into a manageable number of subclasses so that individual questions of law
did not predominate over common questions of fact, the nonresident absentees could be cer-
tified as members of the plaintiff class. Id. at 18, 428 N.E.2d at 484.
Miner conceded that if a national plaintiff class was certified, the court would have to apply
and construe the pertinent laws of each state in which class members lived. See Appellant's
Petition for Leave to Appeal at 42, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981).
Miner asserted, however, that with the exception of Alabama, the consumer protection and
contract law of every state resembled the law of Illinois to a remarkable degree. Id.
94. 87 I11. 2d at 15, 428 N.E.2d 482-83. In a lengthy dissent, in which Justice Underwood
joined, Justice Ryan emphasized that in the absence of minimum contacts between the plaintiff
class members, the litigation, and the forum, the state must have a special interest in the litiga-
tion in order to constitutionally adjudicate the nonresidents' claims. Id. at 22, 23, 428 N.E.2d
at 486. Justice Ryan also stressed that Illinois was depriving nonresident class members of the
right to prosecute their claims in the courts of their home forum, as well as usurping the
authority of foreign courts to adjudicate wrongs occurring within their own borders. Id. at 23,
27, 428 N.E.2d at 486, 488.
95. See, e.g., Shutis v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 550, 557, 567 P.2d 1292,
1310, 1314-15 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86
Wis. 2d 226, 240-41, 271 N.W.2d 879, 887 (1978).
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." Id.
97. See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Il. 2d 27, 428 N.E.2d 478, 488 (Ryan, J., dissen-
ting) (because Illinois has no interest in bringing nonresident litigation into the state, the court
is usurping authority of other jurisdictions to provide a forum for protection of the rights of
their citizens); Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 90, 362 A.2d 1177, 1180 (App.
Div. 1976) (absent minimum contacts with forum, nonresident plaintiff class cannot be cer-
tified unless state's interest in litigation is of sufficient magnitude). Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980) (the sovereign power of state to try cases in its
courts acts as an implied limitation on sovereign power of other states, subject only to due
process concerns of fairness).
98. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 222-23 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
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A state court may decide that it has a special interest in adjudicating a
controversy on behalf of a multistate class for a number of reasons. For ex-
ample, if inclusion of nonresidents appears necessary to vindicate the rights
of the resident class members, or if the alleged wrong perpetrated on a
multistate class originated from within the forum, a state may assert that a
special interest is manifest.99 It is questionable, however, whether a special
state interest exists simply because both resident and nonresident claims
have issues in common.' A state that applies and construes the laws of a
foreign state in such circumstances will be interfering with the foreign
state's right to regulate transactions within its own borders solely on
grounds of judicial efficiency. Such an interest is insufficient to warrant as-
sertion of adjudicative power over the litigation by one forum, to the exclu-
sion of all other jurisdictions, because in a national class action, all states
have similar concerns.'0 ' Moreover, local adjudication of common-question
national class actions, when justified primarily for reasons of judicial
economy, appears to undermine the Supreme Court's mandate in Shaffer v.
Heitner that there be a significant relationship between the parties, the
forum, and the litigation in order for an adjudication of nonresident in-
terests to be valid. 02 Maintaining that a court can exercise binding juris-
diction over persons unaffiliated with the forum in circumstances where the
state has no interest, apart from judicial efficiency, in adjudicating their
claims, wholly disregards the forum-litigation link of Shaffer's tripartite
jurisdictional scheme."' This position suggests that state political integrity is
insignificant in the class action context.
dissenting in part) (whether a state can constitutionally assert jurisdiction over particular con-
troversy may depend on whether the state has substantive interest in adjudicating suit). See
also Consumer Class Actions, supra note 6, at 1428, 1443; Impact, supra note 2, at 1017-18.
Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950) (state's in-
terest in trusts located within forum is constitutionally sufficient to warrant determination of
interests of all nonresident beneficiaries).
99. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 211.
100. Id. at 211. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 86, comment f (1942), expressly excluded
such common-question class suits from the general rule set forth in § 26 that a representative
action may bind individuals who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Corresponding
provisions in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41, 42 (1980), appear to recognize a
similar limitation. See 52 Proceedings, A.L.I., 345-46 (1975).
101. See Impcct, supra note 2, at 1018-19. Furthermore, other states are likely to exhibit
more compelling interests in adjudicating the controversy on behalf of a national plaintiff class
than mere judicial economy. For examples of such heightened interests, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 106-10. Discounting judicial economy as a special state interest may be warranted
by the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84,
95, 362 A.2d 1177, 1183 (App. Div. 1976). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 4 comment g (1980) (court should refuse to entertain action if another forum has substantially
greater relationship with parties or litigation).
102. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Although the Shaffer Court's
reference to this tripartite test was in the context of a nonclass action to establish quasi in rem
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant's property, the Court nevertheless asserted that the
test was to govern "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction." Id. at 212.
103. A few courts have asserted that for various reasons, see supra note 44, a multistate
class action can be adjudicated in the absence of a link between nonresident plaintiff class
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Such a proposition is unsupported by precedent.0 °4 Indeed, both the
Shutts and Schlosser courts indicated that a special state interest justified
their certification of a multistate plaintiff class.' The Miner court,
however, did not address the issue. This omission suggests that the Illinois
court did not recognize the requirement that the state have a special interest
in adjudicating the claims of nonresident class members. Had the court at-
tempted to determine whether a special state interest existed, it would have
been unable to identify such an interest. In contrast to the situation in
Schlosser, the vast majority of plaintiff class members in Miner lived out-
side the forum"' and Gillette's only connection with Illinois was that it had
conducted some business in the state.' 7 Furthermore, unlike the factual cir-
cumstances in Shutts, where the great majority of the disputed gas leases
were located within the forum, most of the transactional subject matter in
Miner occurred outside the forum.' 08 If Gillette's promotion had directed
that the money solicited be sent to an Illinois entity, Illinois may have had a
special interest in adjudicating the suit on behalf of the national plaintiff
class. 109 Because Gillette had incorporated in Delaware, maintained its head-
quarters in Massachusetts, and directed that all funds solicited be sent to a
Minnesota entity, there was little reason for Illinois to adjudicate the non-
resident claims.'' 0
Nevertheless, the Miner court concluded that, according to case law,
compliance with procedural due process was all that was constitutionally re-
quired to subject nonresident plaintiff class members to a foreign state's
jurisdiction in representative suits.''' In each of the cases cited by the Miner
court, state judgments were held to bind nonresidents who, subsequent to
adjudication of the class action, had instituted independent proceedings on
members and the forum. See, e.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d
1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978). These courts, however, have based their asser-
tion of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the strength of the relationship existing between the
forum and the litigation. Id. at 550, 557, 567 P.2d at 1310, 1314-15. Consequently, these opin-
ions do not support the view that state sovereignty considerations are irrelevant in the class ac-
tion context.
104. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 211-12. To the contrary, sovereignty concerns traditionally
have been germane to the exercise of jurisdiction in representative suits. This statement is sup-
ported by the fact that initially class actions were restricted to intrastate disputes. See Von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121, 1154 (1966).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51 & 60-61.
106. In Miner, only 12,000 of the nearly 180,000 class members were Illinois residents. See
supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
107. Appellant's Petition for Leave to Appeal at'21, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 I11. 2d 7, 428
N.E.2d 478 (1981).
108. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
109. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 211. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 I11. App. 483, 101
N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1951) (implicit that Illinois has interest in redressing national solicitation
occasioned by Illinois entity).
110. 87 I11. 2d at 24, 428 N.E.2d at 487 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 15, 428 N.E.2d 483.
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similar claims in other jurisdictions.' 2  Those cases, however, are
distinguishable from Miner, not only because they can be justified through
minimum contacts analysis, but also because they involved circumstances in
which the state had a special interest in hearing the suit despite the
multistate character of the plaintiff class.' 3
The cases relied upon by the Miner court are of two types. One group of
cases concerns the authority of the state to affect the liability of nonresident
plaintiffs who have voluntarily associated with state-created entities such as
state-chartered corporations.'' 4 Cases in this category hold that because
absentee class members had statutory notice that the state could regulate the
rights of all persons who associate with its state-created corporations, their
continued relationship with suich companies could be construed as implied
consent to be bound by all state court determinations relating to their cor-
porate interests.''
It seems beyond reproach that the state may have a special reason to ad-
judicate the claims of nonresident class members who have interests in en-
tities situated and licensed within the forum." ' Moreover, maintenance of
such a relationship between nonresidents and local entities is akin to the
kind of purposeful activity necessary to secure jurisdiction over
nonresidents under the minimum contacts criterion."' In Miner, no cor-
112. See, e.g., Hartford Life Ins.'Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915) (Minnesota resident in-
sured by Hartford Co. bound by previous Connecticut judgment levied against class of Con-
necticut policyholders who disputed company's power to raise premium assessments of its in-
sureds); Larson v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 I11. 614, 27 N.E.2d 458 (Illinois insureds
bound by prior California judgment upholding power of state officials to liquidate and
rehabilitate resident bankrupt insurer against wishes of plaintiff class of policyholders), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 69 (1940).
113. See generally Impact, suprd note 2, at 1017-18; Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions,
supra note 19, at 724-26; Consumer Class Actions, supra note 6, at 1428.
114. A judgment upholding the statutory authority of the state to liquidate and reorganize
an insolvent insurer against the will of an intrastate class of insureds was held to bar the in-
stitution of similar class suits on the policies in other states. See Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307, 74 P.2d 761 (1937), aff'd sub nom. Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S.
297 (1938). See also Padway v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 42 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Wis. 1942)
(nonresident insurance contracts subject to state's vital interest in regulating business
significantly affecting public welfare); Taylor v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 770, 200
S.E. 882 (1939) (nonresident policyholder bound by local judgment maintaining state's police
power to reorganize businesses whose failures may have deleterious impact nationwide).
115. See, e.g., Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516, 532-33 (1967) (where courts have
statutory authorization to determine Otockholder liability for corporate debts, stockholder con-
structively consents to corporate representation in assessment proceeding); Christopher v.
Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 503-04 (1938) (as consequence of corporate membership,
stockholder voluntarily assumed relationship subject to state police power).
116. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950). See
also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223-24 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) (state has recognized interest in providing forum for determining rights and
liabilities of persons that have stake in locally chartered corporations).
117. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-99 (1980)
(nonresident not personally amenable to court's jurisdiction unless he purposefully availed
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porate entity was situated in Illinois with which all members of the plaintiff
class had associated."' Thus, the state-chartered corporation cases do not
support the Miner court's conclusion that individuals lacking germane con-
tacts with the forum may be bound by a local class action judgment in the
absence of a special state interest in adjudicating their claims.
The second category of cases relied on by Miner involved property
situated within the forum state but held in common by a multistate plaintiff
class. These cases recognized the state's authority to bind nonresident
absentees to judgments concerning disposition of the property." 9 Most of
these decisions involved nonresident contributions to insurance funds main-
tained in the forum by insurance companies or fraternal benefit societies.
This group of "common fund" cases2 0 provide little support for the Miner
court's proposition that special state interests are not required to bind
nonresident plaintiffs to local judgments. Despite the multistate composi-
tion of the contributing class, uniform distribution of property located
within the state was considered a matter of public interest.'" In Miner, the
only fund owned in common by members of the plaintiff class was located
in Minnesota, where all monies solicited during the lighter promotion were
sent. 22
It is apparent that case law relied on in Miner does not support the pro-
position that in the absence of a special state interest in adjudicating
nonresident claim;, nonresidents who have no relationship with the forum
may nevertheless be bound by a local judgment merely because they are ac-
corded due process protections. Miner is the first state court decision to
himself of the benefits of state law) and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (nonresi-
dent not subject to in personam jurisidction of forum unless some purposeful, bilateral activity
occurred between nonresident and forum that satisfied minimum contacts requirements enun-
ciated in International Shoe) with Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 92, 362
A.2d 1177, 1181 (App. Div. 1976) (plaintiff stockholders interest in local corporation sufficient
to warrant exercise of jurisdiction over them).
118. See supra text accompanying note 110.
119. See, e.g., Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938)
(beneficial membership certificates); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915) (mor-
tuary fund); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915) (widows'
and orphans' benefit fund).
120. In Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1964), the court defined a common
fund as a fund owned by several persons in which each person had an interest in the entire
fund. Id. at 526. The term "common fund" in this Note refers to monies owned jointly by a
multistate group of persons but managed by a single entity within the forum state. If the fund
is disturbed, all, as opposed to some, of the contributions will be affected.
121. See, e.g., Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1915) (danger that con-
flicting state decisions will inequitably deplete fund and injure "mutual rights" of class). A
further rationale underlying extension of the state's jurisdiction in such circumstances is that
the voluntary nature of the nonresident's contributions evidences contact with the forum which
independently is sufficient to support jurisdiction. See Impact, supra note 2, at 1016;
Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 19, at 725-26. See also supra note 116.
122. 87 Ill. 2d at 21, 428 N.E.2d at 486 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Ironically, it can be argued
that the Miner court's reliance on the common fund cases suggests that Minnesota had a
significantly greater interest in adjudicating the nonresident claims than did Illinois.
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condone the certification of a multistate plaintiff class where the state has
no interest, aside from judicial efficiency, in adjudicating the claims of
nonresidents who have no germane affiliation with the forum. Absent a
special state interest in adjudicating the rights of persons who lack germane
contacts with the forum, it is questionable whether a judgment purporting
to bind these individuals would command full faith and credit throughout
the Union. '2
IMPACT
Unless the Supreme Court eventually compels states to recognize
multistate class action judgments promulgated by state courts that have no
special interest in adjudicating nonresident claims, it is clear that these
judgments will not be accorded binding effect in some state courts. Courts
in Pennsylvania""4 and New Jersey 2' have indicated that they will not honor
such judgments because these judgments, in effect, abrogate the significance
of state sovereignty in the class action context.' 26 Curiously, even though
the Miner decision is supposedly grounded on Kansas precedent, it is uncer-
tain that Miner would receive full faith and credit in that state. "' In Shutts,
the Kansas Supreme Court stressed that irrespective of procedural due pro-
cess protections, if no special state interest justified inclusion of a multistate
class lacking contact with the forum, nonresidents would be excluded from
the plaintiff class.' 8
The manner in which the remaining states will respond to Miner depends
on the position each will assume regarding the significance of state
sovereignty in the class action context. The prevalent judicial attitude is that
respect for the sovereign authority of state jurisdictions mandates that the
forum have some special interest in the litigation in order to legitimately
preempt other jurisdictions from entertaining the suit.' 9 The contrary argu-
ment is twofold. First, because class actions purportedly provide constitu-
tionally sufficient protection of an absent class member's individual
substantive claims, the interest of the class member's home state in pro-
viding him with a forum for redress is irrelevant in the event another
jurisdiction first grants him an opportunity to obtain relief in its courts."'
123. The fact that nonresidents receive notice of the suit and have a chance to opt out of the
class is conceivably irrelevant because a court devoid of authority to bind absentees supposedly
also lacks authority to require these persons to decline the opportunity to participate. See
Fisch, supra note 5, at 212; Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 19, at 734.
124. See Klemow v. Time, Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 352 A.2d 12 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1977).
125. See Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (App. Div. 1976).
126. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
127. See 87 111. 2d at 24, 428 N.E.2d at 487 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
128. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 550, 557, 567 P.2d 1292, 1310, 1314-15
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
129. See id.; Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 90-92, 362 A.2d 1177,
1180-81 (App. Div. 1976). See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
130. See Developments, supra note 43, at 1318, 1404 & n.73.
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Second, imposing territorial limitations on state jurisdictional authority in
the class action context would seriously frustrate judicial efficiency, the very
policy underlying utilization of the class action mechanism. 3 '
If all courts eventually were to adopt the Miner approach and assert that
the only requirement necessary to certify a multistate plaintiff class is com-
pliance with procedural due process, perhaps the only adverse consequence
which may result is that a race for judgment will ensue when two jurisdic-
tions simultaneously adjudicate the claims of the same plaintiff class.' 32 Un-
til the validity of Miner-type actions is universally recognized, however,
several adverse legal effects may occur as a result of imperfect res judicata
treatment being afforded such judgments.' 33
Although the defendant would risk being subject to numerous suits in the
absence of multistate class suits, if the defendant litigates under the impres-
sion that he is risking liability to a national plaintiff class in a single pro-
ceeding, it would seem oppressive to subject him to subsequent actions in
other states in the event he secures a favorable judgment in the initial ad-
judication. 3 " Moreover, not only is a multistate class action conceivably
more difficult and time consuming to adjudicate than single-state class
suits,' 33 but maintenance of the former is no more efficient than a series of
the single-state suits if the class suit purporting to have national effect pro-
131. See Ross, supra note 1, at 425-26.
132. Numerous class suits arise contemporaneously as a result of a particular course of con-
duct. See, e.g., In re Turner Enters. 521 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1975) (federal class suit con-
flicted with similar state class action against common defendant); West Virginia v. Charles
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (2d Cir. 1971) (66 class actions pending against drug
companies for identical antitrust violations consolidated into one action comprised of three
broad subclasses). Note that unlike the federal system, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976 & Supp. III
1979) (provision for consolidation of multidistrict litigation), there is no mechanism for con-
solidating identical class actions simultaneously arising in states from a defendant's wrongful
conduct.
133. In general, the doctrine of res judicata provides that when a court of competent
jurisdiction decides the merits of a case, all parties to the action are subsequently bound "not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or de-
mand, but as to any other admissable matter which might have been offered for that
purpose." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). See also Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (if judgment res judicata, it terminates plaintiff's cause of
action on all ground:, absent fraud). Should all courts not recognize the validity of a court's
decision, the decision will receive imperfect res judicata treatment.
134. See Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 19, at 738. Professor Brainerd Currie
noted the unfairness of such a result in a discussion of the contemporary ramifications of the
doctrine of mutuality. See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 285-89 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Currie].
135. Tornquist, supra note 1, at 47; Consumer Class Actions, supra note 6, at 1448. A
multistate class action may not be any more tedious to adjudicate than an intrastate class suit
if the law of the forum is found to be controlling, see, e.g., Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
86 Wis. 2d 226, 239-41, 271 N.W.2d 879, 885-86 (1978) (judicial task simplified by applying
single state's law to multistate dispute), or if the class can be consolidated into a minimal
number of subclasses for choice of law purposes. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 18,
428 N.E.2d 478, 484 (1981). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.3(b) (1979) (subclass provi-
sion).
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mises to be but the first of numerous suits adjudicating the claims of
similarly situated persons. In this respect, because the class action statutes
of many states require class actions to be the "superior" means of efficiently
resolving the dispute,' 36 maintenance of Miner-type actions, having im-
perfect res judicata effect, would contravene the statutory precepts of these
forums. '"
In addition to the adverse legal effects generated by non-uniform adop-
tion of multistate class judgments like Miner,'38 the opinion will have
adverse practical consequences within Illinois as well. By eliminating all ter-
ritorial limitations on certification of a national plaintiff class, Miner
enhances the attractiveness of Illinois class suits to deter consumer exploita-
tion, and thus, will encourage the filing of multistate consumer class suits in
Illinois.' 39 As in Miner, perhaps the only connection such suits will have
with Illinois will be that the defendant does business within the forum and
the nonresident and resident claimants seek common relief. If such suits are
afforded imperfect res judicata treatment, the Illinois judicial system may
be brought into disrepute."" Furthermore, because class suits are inherently
time consuming to adjudicate,"' entertaining more of these suits will place
136. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 60-223(b)(3) (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 13.220(2)(b) 2 (1977);
ALA. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); ARiz. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(b); COLO. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3); D.C. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); HAWAI R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); IDAHO R. 23(b)(3); KY. R. CIw.
P. 23; MASS. R. Civ. P. 23(b); MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.02(3); OHIO R. Civ. P. 23.01(3); TENN. R.
Civ. P. 23.01(3); TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4); UTAH R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); VT. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3);
WASH. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). These statutes are derived from the federal rule which requires that
maintenance of a class action be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
137. Illinois courts have more discretion than their federal counterparts in determining
whether to allow class actions to proceed. See Forde, supra note 7, at 230. In Illinois, as op-
posed to the federal system, initiation of a class action merely must be an "appropriate," ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-801 (1981), rather than a "superior," FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), means of
adjudicating the dispute. Even under this more lenient standard, however, it is uncertain that a
multistate class suit which fails to bind all class members could be permitted.
138. There are a few factors that may marginally inhibit subsequent suits from being
brought in states that challenge, on jurisdictional grounds, a previous multistate class action
judgment favoring the defendant. For example, because class suits are time consuming to ad-
judicate, see Duval, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Ex-
perience, AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1023, 1024, the statute of limitations in other jurisdic-
tions may run during the initial action. See, e.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan.
527, 545, 567 P.2d 1292, 1307 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978). In addition, if the
defendant initially prevails, the first judgment may deter future suits from being filed because
potential class representatives may feel that maintenance of further suits would be futile in
light of the prior court's resolution of the dispute. See Comment, The Spurious Class Suit: Pro-
cedural and Practical Problems Confronting Court and Counsel, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 633
(1958).
139. 87 Ill. 2d at 27-28, 428 N.E.2d at 488-89 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
140. See Currie, supra note 134, at 288-89.
141. A recent empirical study of two federal district courts with heavy caseloads revealed
that class action suits seeking damages took more than four times longer to adjudicate than
similar nonclass suits. See Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
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a greater burden on the already overburdened Illinois courts." ' Since the
state has neither a duty"34 nor a special interest in hearing the claims of
nonresidents who have no contact with the forum, the utility, not to men-
tion the constitutionality, of adjudicating such suits is suspect. The above
arguments demonstrate that the Illinois Supreme Court should have denied
certification to the nonresident plaintiff class in Miner.
CONCLUSION
Since the recent expulsion of consumer class suits from the federal
forum, class action advocates have been urging state courts to entertain
representative suits comprised primarily of nonresident plaintiff classes.
State courts are not in accordance as to whether it is relevant that nonresi-
dent absentees have germane contacts with the forum in order to be bound
by local adjudications of their interests. Until the Miner decision, however,
all courts agreed that in the absence of such contacts, a special state interest
must be manifest to bind nonresident class members to state court
judgments so that the forum state does not unfairly usurp the sovereign
authority of sister jurisdictions to regulate transactions within their borders.
The Miner court's failure to adhere to precedent places the decision on
uncertain constitutional footing. Until the Supreme Court resolves the con-
stitutional issues, adverse legal consequences will result if judgments obtain-
ed in suits similar to Miner are not accorded full faith and credit in other
states.
Although the Miner decision clearly enhances the attractiveness of Illinois
class actions to combat consumer exploitation by abrogating all territorial
349, 361, 367 (1978). The study concluded, however, that class actions were at least as efficient
as nonclass suits in respect to time expended per sums recovered for injuries incurred. Id. at
369. But see infra note 143.
142. 87 Ill. 2d at 27-28, 428 N.E.2d at 488-89 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Compare City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 467 (2d Cir. 1974) (because judicial resources are
limited, it is uncertain that undertaking "herculean tasks" of adjudicating national class ac-
tions is in the public interest) with In re Antibiotic Antitrust Proceedings, 410 F. Supp. 659,
669 (D. Minn. 1974) ("neither . . . complexity of issues nor the magnitude of the claimants
and the asserted damages can be allowed to preclude the fair administration of justice" in a
class action).
143. See 87 Ill. 2d at 25, 428 N.E.2d at 487 (Ryan, J., dissenting). While the state may have
a duty to provide a forum to redress nonresident claims if no better forum can be located, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, introductory note to chapter 2, at 23 (1980), it is sug-
gested that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is discretionary rather than obligatory.
Id. § 4 comment a. Consequently, from a practical standpoint, in determining whether a
multistate class action should be entertained, the issue is not whether the extra time spent to
adjudicate nonresident claims redresses more claims per dollars expended than a comparable
number of nonclass actions. See supra note 141. Rather, the question is whether the extra time
and money spent was warranted in light of costs imposed on the taxpayers of the forum,
whose courts had no duty to hear the nonresident claims. See 87 Ill. 2d at 27, 428 N.E.2d 488
(Ryan, J., dissenting). Absent a special state interest to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction over
a plaintiff class unaffiliated with the forum, the disutility of adjudicating these claims becomes
apparent. See Impact, supra note 2, at 1019.
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limitations on certification of a multistate plaintiff class, the court failed to
consider the practical effects that adjudication of such suits may have on
the Illinois judicial system. At the very least, the Miner opinion invites an
onslaught of trivial suits to be filed in Illinois courts, suits that the state will
have little reason to consider on behalf of a nonresident plaintiff class.
Marc Robert Lieberman
